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Summary findings
As is evident from public finance principles,  elasticity (with respect to income) of willingness to pay
redistribution objectives do not influence environmental  for environmental improvements.
policies if there are other, costless means of  Strategies to control urban air pollution would be
redistribution.  How does optimal environmental  altered by redistribution  objectives - to be more
protection depend on redistribution  objectives?  aggressive in reducing emissions from luxury goods such
Eskeland and Kong develop a framework that treats air  as transport  (private and general) and less aggressive for
quality as a pure public good, and tracks net beneficiaries  goods more heavily consumed by the poor  (including
as those who value air quality improvements more than  several energy sources).
their costs in a pollution control strategy.  Some air pollution control strategies cover urban and
The framework highlights the distributional  rural areas. For those, optimal pollution control would
characteristics of the public good and of the costs for the  typically be reduced by redistribution  objectives, as rural
control strategy. One critical parameter for the  households are net losers, and they are poorer.
distributional characteristics of the public good is the
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How does optimal environmental  protection  depend on income levels, and on concerns  for
redistribution?  In developing countries, natural assets such as trees and soil provide employment
and a livelihood to many poor, so it is quite intuitive that protection of such resources can be
important  even at low-income  levels. However,  even for problems  associated  with industrialization
and urbanization, such as ambient air pollution, evidence is mounting that control initiatives may
be  worthwhile. The present study focuses on how strategies to reduce local air pollution in
Indonesia affects different income groups, and on how those strategies would be influenced  by a
particular concern for the poor. The study thus does not ask whether income growth is good or bad
for the environment,  and does not treat transnational  or global environmental  problems.'
In this introductory section, we briefly visit Java, the setting chosen for our empirical
investigation. We then present the traditional welfare economic approach to  environmental
protection, and the simplifying  assumptions involved when one excludes analysis of how effects
are distributed.  We then review some applied studies that have included  distributional  implications,
first in general public finance and then for environmental  policies. Section 2 develops  an analytical
framework and introduces  the concept of distributional  characteristics  for public goods. Section 3
analyzes how distributional  considerations  would influence  air pollution control strategies-first  in
the balance between alternative control strategies, and then to  determine whether optimally
provided air quality would be higher or lower under redistributive  objectives.  Section 4 concludes.
Jakarta and Java-The  Setting for the Empirical  Analysis
About half of Indonesia's population live on the island of Java (100 million). The soils are
fertile, and rural population densities are among the highest in the world. The city of Jakarta is
home to about 8 million  people, with about  twice as many in the greater metropolitan  area.
Ambient air pollution  levels in Jakarta  regularly exceed World  Health Organization  (WHO)
guidelines by factors of two to four. Present analysis indicates that suspended particulates (a
measure of dust) should  be of greatest concern,  due to effects on respiratory  diseases  and premature
mortality. A recent study concluded that significant improvements in public health could be
obtained through ambient  air improvement. 2
On these  questions,  see, for instance,  World  Commission  on Environment  and Development  (1987),  Mink
(1993),  Grossman  and Krueger  (1995),  World  Bank  (1992),  and  Cline  (1992).  There  are  two  views  on whether
pollution  control  is worthwhile:  (i) that few complete  cost  benefit  analyses  have  been  made  for a developing
country  city,  and (ii)  that  actual  pollution  control  reflects that  they  have  been  found  worthwhile.  Examples  of
benefit  estimates  for air quality  improvements  in developing  countries  are  found  for Taiwan  in Alberini  et al.
(1997),  and  for Chile  in World  Bank  (1994),  Eskeland  (1997),  and  Bowland  et al.  (1998).  World  Bank  (1994)  and
Eskeland  (1997)  find  that  modestly  estimated  health  benefits  alone  would  exceed  control  costs  for  Santiago,  Chile.
2 Public  health  improvements  include  reduced  damnage  to the learning  abilities  of children,  reduced  illness  among
children  and  adults,  and  about  1500  fewer  premature  deaths  annually  (Ostro  1994).
lOur Approach: Public Goods  Provision under Redistributive Objectives,  and the Polluter Pays
We think of ambient air quality as a pure public good in the sense that it can be consumed
(or enjoyed) by one person without excluding the enjoyment of another. Individuals may have a
weak or a strong  preference for the air quality they collectively  enjoy, and their willingness-to-pay
to pay for improved  air quality may depend  inter alia on income and air quality. Emitting pollution
into the air, in contrast,  is an exclusive  activity, and emissions  correspond  directly  to the activity of
providing  a public good in traditional  terminology-though with the opposite  sign.
Air pollution is linked to emissions  from natural sources,  and from human activities such as
household energy use, industrial processes and transportation. In  terms of  physical actions,
emission control strategies can (i) reduce the scale of polluting activities; (ii) modify them to
pollute less per unit of output, and/or; (iii) move them geographically  to less sensitive areas. In
terms of policy instruments,  such changes are typically stimulated by regulation  or market-based
incentives,  such as emission  taxes. Thus, in physical  terms air quality is a privately  provided public
good, but the government  serves  in a coordinating  role, in effect procuring  the public good.
The typical prescription from welfare economics is that  public goods provision, or
pollution control in our case, be pursued to the point where marginal benefits, when aggregated
over individuals,  no longer exceed marginal  cost. It is straightforward  to support such advice to an
economic planner if she has available instruments that can costlessly transfer income between
households  (such as lump-sum  taxes). In such a case, the government  may pursue projects, public
goods  provision, and environmental  policies with sole focus on total costs and benefits, irrespective
how these are distributed  between  households.
Thus limiting the analysis to  aggregate net benefits is often described as using "the
compensation  criterion," since hypothetical  compensation  of losers is used to link a simple sum of
individual  experiences  with social  welfare. Such an analytical  basis is typically not very suitable for
environmental policies: Efficiency is easier to achieve when polluters face the full cost of their
emissions, making compensating transfers either unrealistic or inadvisable (see  OECD 1975;
Baumol and Oates 1988; Eskeland  and Jimenez 1992).
If one excludes costless compensating  transfers, increased (or reduced) pollution control
would rarely be Pareto-improving,  even if aggregate  marginal  benefits were to exceed control costs
by a wide margin. Then, distributional  implications  can be relevant to policy, and we proceed to
analyze  the distributional  implications  for costs and benefits.
Many authors have studied optimal supply of public goods under distortionary revenue
generation.  Pigou's conjecture  was that optimal supply of public goods is lower when transfers to
the government are costly than in the case with costless transfers to the government. 3 Since we
study a public good that is privately  provided (by those who reduce pollution),  our emphasis is on
redistribution  between  households,  rather than on transfers to government. Still, if lump-sum taxes
are  available, they eliminate the need to  let redistributive objectives influence other policy
instruments  in our model,  just as they do in a model focusing  on revenue generation.  Our modeling
approach for the benefits of public goods provision is very similar to one given in Atkinson and
Stiglitz  (1980, page 496, citing an unpublished  manuscript  by Arnott 1978),  with a result depending
3 Stiglitz  and  Dasgupta  (1971),  Atkinson  and  Stem  (1974)  and others,  have  examined  this  question.
2on the covariance  between willingness-to-pay  for the public good and the social marginal utility of
income.
In this paper, we develop a model for the evaluation  of distributional  implications  both for
the costs of provision  and for the benefits,  and take it through an empirical  application.  We identify
strategies to reduce air pollution on Java or in Jakarta, emphasizing  particulates. We assume that
emission reductions are induced directly by regulation, although the analysis can be modified to
allow for other instruments,  such as taxes levied on emissions or on consumption  (all these have in
common that they increase the costs to users of polluting goods and inputs). Importantly, if we
assumed that the social planner were equipped not only with regulatory instruments (emission
standards, say) but also with sector-specific  taxes on emissions and outputs, then she would have a
richer set of instrumrents  with which to pursue goals. In that case, it would less likely be important
to let redistributive objectives goals influence the pollution control program itself (for analysis
along these lines, see Eskeland 1996).4
Strategies to reduce emissions from households,  such as emission standards for household
energy use or personal vehicles,  will increase the cost of such consumption,  and incidence  analysis
is simple. Incidence analysis for control strategies affecting  the economy as a whole (including
industries)  requires a more involved analysis.  Assuming  that an industry's increased costs will be
passed on to other industries,  such control strategies  will also result in a pattern of cost increases  for
consumers. We use input-output analysis to  estimate the resulting cost  increases of various
consumption  goods,  in order to assess the distribution  of costs amongst  households.
The benefits of a pollution control strategy, in contrast,  will accrue to households  living in
areas where the air quality improves.  Thus, if you live in an area where transport is an important
contributor to pollution, and you are not a user of transport services, you will likely be a  net
beneficiary from a  transport control strategy. Apart from the distribution among households of
physical environmental improvements, however, the benefit distribution depends on how the
households value these improvements.  Lacking empirical results on how valuation of air quality
varies with income,  we employ sensitivity  analysis.
To analyze policy changes in a context with winners and losers we employ a welfare
function; we may think of it as a planner's tool. It is defined over each household's well-being,  and
describes how (according to the planner's objectives) one household's loss can substitute for
another household's gain 5. As a starting point, we employ equal priority weight to increments in
4 The emission  reductions  resulting  from emission  taxes  can under  certain  assumptions  be replicated  by a
combination  of emission  standards  and taxes  on  polluting  goods.  Thus,  the  additional  (redundant)  instruments  can
be used  for  redistributive  purposes,  keeping  the  emission  reductions  constant.  For  instance,  one  could  institute  first-
best  emission  controls  on  cars  without  harming  car-owning  households,  by combining  emission  standards  with  car
(or  gasoline)  subsidies.
5A  plausible  set of welfare  functions  includes  functions  that  are  non-negative  in every  individual's  well-being.  A
welfare  function  is concave  and redistributive  (as is ours)  if it applies  welfare  weights  that  are  non-increasing  in
individual  well-being.  Among  concave  redistributive  ones, as extreme  cases,  there is the Rawlsian  welfare
function,  which  accepts  a policy  change  as  an improvement  in social  welfare  only  if it improves  the  well-being  for
the  individual  that  is worst  off,  and  a linear  welfare  function,  which  is  not strictly  concave.  Poverty  measures  can
also  be interpreted  as a set of welfare  functions,  most  of which  have  in common  that  they  apply  a zero  weight  to
welfare  improvements  beyond  a specified  threshold  level  (the  poverty  line).  A frequently  used  poverty  measure,
3utility (or well-being)  to rich and poor. This selects the efficient  pollution control program, the one
that would be optimal with no remaining  priority for redistribution,  as when costless transfers are
available. Starting  from such a point, we increase  the planner's "inequality  aversion,"  or the "price"
the planner is willing to pay in order to institute  transfers to poorer households.  The model allows
us to examine the following questions:  Relative to an efficient pollution control program, which
control strategies would be scaled back and which would be  strengthened under aversion to
inequality? 6 Would  the optimal  air quality be higher  or lower  with inequality  aversion?
Applications of Social Welfare  Functions with Redistributive  Objectives
For applied public expenditure  analysis,  McGuire and Aaron (1969), Aaron and McGuire
(1970) and Maital (1973) made advances  by proposing  a methodology  for including differences in
valuation of public goods by income class. In a context with a redistributive welfare function,
Feldstein (1972) showed how distributional  characteristics  for consumer goods (used here) are
useful in tax analysis.
There are few applications  with strictly concave welfare functions. The welfare function
used here is discussed  in Atkinson (1970),  and a number  of applications  from developing countries
are presented in Newbery and Stern (1987). In Atkinson's social welfare function, a parameter (E)
specifies the planner's aversion to inequality.  Atkinson used parameter values of one and two for
illustration, and values in this range are typical for applied studies, including the present one. To
illustrate, assume that one household has an income double that of another, and that the planner
evaluates making transfer from the richer to the poorer, even if something will be lost in the
transfer. Then, for inequality  aversion E = 1, the planner would be willing to lose up to half of the
resources  taken from the rich in order to institute  the transfer,  and for E = 2 she would be willing to
lose up to three quarters.'
Another strand of the normative  literature uses  poverty measures, a class of welfare functions
ignoring  the well-being of individuals  above a certain threshold of income or well-being. We do
not  perform alternative calculations with  poverty measures, but  there  are  indications that
the  head-count  index,  would  be rather  crude  in analysis  like  the  present  one:  It would  merely  count  the  net  number
of individuals  (or  households)  who  cross  the  poverty  line  from  below  as  a result  of the  policy  change.
6 Hylland  and Zeckhauser  (1979)  argue that  distributional  objectives  should  affect  taxes, but not program  design.
They  assume  that  total  benefits  do not depend  on the distribution  of income,  and  thus exclude  most cases  in which
program  benefits  are nornal goods, as in  our  case.
7At  wide dispersions  in income,  implications  are greater:  In our  Java  survey  data,  the relative  values  of transfers  to
households  in the first and the fifth income  quintile  is 7 for e = 1, and 45 for e  = 2 (We use each quintile's
median,  see annex  table 4). For normative  evaluations,  Ahmad  and Stem  use parameters  of inequality  aversion  (E)
equal  to 0.1 through 2 in tax analysis  for India  (1987,  page 302), Heady  and Mitra  use e = 1, 2 and 6 (1987).
Braverman,  Hammer  and Ahn  use e  = 0.5 through  (almost)  infnity (Korea),  Newbery  (1987)  uses E  = 1 and 2,
Hughes  (1987)  uses E  equal  to I for  Thailand,  stating  that  2 gives  similar  results.  In positive  analysis,  Christiansen
and Jansen  (1978)  views  data on the Norwegian  tax system  as an expression  of social  preference.  They estirnate
values of  E  - 0.9 and 1.8, emphasizing  the former,  and remark that the system  reflects  moderate inequality
aversion.
4conclusions based on poverty measures might not be very different. 8 Finally, a policy-oriented
literature on targeting is distributionally  oriented with a  motivation similar to  ours: viewing a
limited  set  of  policy  instruments as  available for  redistributive objectives, one  analyzes
distributional  implications, usually with a poverty measure in the objective function (Besley and
Kanbur 1988  is a good example).
Concernfor the Distribution of Costs and Benefits in Environmental Policy  Analysis
Few applied studies analyze  the distribution  of impacts of pollution control policies, and to
our knowledge none exist which does this in the context of a strictly concave welfare function.
However, many view distributional patterns as possible determinants of policy adoption in a
political economy model, rather than as inputs in a traditional  welfare evaluation.  A nonempirical
example is Buchanan and  Tullock (1975), in  the  influential "Polluters' profit and  political
response." They argue forcefully  that the lack of success in adoption  of environmental  taxes is due
to the unfortunate political economy of its distributional implications: "In terms of their own
private interests, owners of firmns  in the industry along with employees will oppose the tax. By
contrast, under regulation firms may well secure pecuniary gains from the imposition of direct
controls." They observed that a public agency charged with protecting the environment  would go
along in a regulatory approach since it allows greater environmental  improvement  for a given cost
imposed  on polluters.
Some studies focus on the distribution  of costs for environmentally  motivated  energy price
increases, such as Krupnick et al. (1993), which study gasoline taxes. Whalley and Wigle (1991)
and  Stephan et al. (1992) employ computable general equilibrium models to  analyze carbon
limitations. They include analysis of the distribution  of costs, the first amongst countries and the
latter amongst income groups in a country. Rose et al. (1988) and Wernstedt (1995) are examples
of studies that employ input-output models to track the burden of policies to protect natural
resource. All of these studies have in common that they do not analyze benefits, let alone their
distribution.
Almost all studies that include the distribution  of benefits have limited the benefit analysis
to physical indicators, such as reductions in pollution concentrations.  Thus, the question of how
different groups value environmental improvements is not  addressed. Pearce's (1980) review
concludes that  evidence on  income elasticities for the  willingness-to-pay for environmental
improvements is  "almost entirely inconclusive." 9 Christiansen and  Tietenberg (1985) review
studies that, with one exception,  use physical measures to impute the distribution of benefits. The
exception is Johnson (1980), who employs the method proposed by Aaron, McGuire and Maital,
inferring  variation in willingness-to-pay  from variation  in the marginal  utility of income.
On the distribution of pollutant measures,  Freeman (1972) and many others find evidence
that within U.S. cities, poorer households  reside in areas with lower air quality (this is a pattern we
find in Jakarta as well). Along these lines, there has also been a lively debate (and some careful
8 Ravallion  (1994) reports  that poverty  measures  rank income distributions  quite consistently  with Atkinson's
social  welfare  functions  for inequality  aversion  parameters  as low  as e = I to  2.
9He  does  not find  any study  that  presents  a credible  method  and  results.
5studies) on "environmental  justice." In the United States,  poor and/or minorities  are (in some cases
at least) over-represented  in areas with higher pollution indicators. Sexton et al. (1993) review
environmental  justice studies on air pollution and associated  health risks. Brooks and Sethi (1997)
include political economy perspectives.  Typically,  these studies examine data on pollution levels,
rather than changes in control costs and environmental  benefits due to policies and choices, which
is the emphasis  of the present study.
A few interesting  observations  on the distributional  impacts  of air pollution control policies
may be  mentioned. Peskin (1978), in a  study of the  United States, finds that benefits are
concentrated in a few regions in the North East. Control costs are more evenly distributed, so the
net beneficiaries  will be in minority (he presents national policy adoption as a remaining  puzzle).
Among his findings are that "those who gain. . . are likely to be nonwhite,  low-income,  inner city
residents," and he comments that these may be likely targets if politicians seek to protect weak
groups. Harrison (1977, and in other papers) observes that many cars in rural areas are owned by
poor households,  and that emission controls  in those areas would not yield appreciable air quality
improvements.  Thus, he argued, a "two-car strategy" with less expensive controls for cars in rural
areas would be good for efficiency  and equity  reasons. We may note that later developments  in the
United States have some features  addressing  these  patterns: local jurisdictions  to some extent shape
their own air pollution control strategies. California,  with high incomes and air pollution levels,
now applies the strictest  emission  standards  in the country.
Turning to the benefit valuation,  there is not much empirical evidence  on how willingness-
to-pay for environmental  improvements  increases  with income. Although environmental  quality is
typically assumed to be a normal good (that is, the income elasticity of willingness-to-pay for
environmental improvements,  .l,  is positive), it is often argued that pollution reductions benefit
the poor most because they live in the more polluted areas (see above). These statements are not
necessarily inconsistent-since  the normality of the good refers to how different income groups
would value identical air quality improvements.  In fact, if the choice of residential location  in part
is influenced by air quality, then the less wealthy would live in more polluted areas precisely
because their willingness-to-pay  for air quality is lower (this is exploited  in the hedonic method for
empirical estimation of benefits). Empirical results on the willingness-to-pay  for environmental
improvements are sparse in  general, and can in theory be site-specific. Public goods such as
pollution levels are in principle "tradable" in a Tiebout type model with migration between sites
that offer different amounts of the public good. Within such a model, empirical identification of
willingness-to-pay  is possible in principle,  but applied studies typically yield too little information
to differentiate  willingness-to-pay  by income.
Smith and Huang (1993), in an analysis  of estimates  from a collection of hedonic models,
find that income has a positive  significant  coefficient  in some models of willingness-to-pay  (but not
all), implying  that air quality is a normal good. However,  the reporting  of the results does not allow
deduction  of an income elasticity.  For air quality improvements  in developing  countries, Alberini  et
al. (1994) use survey returns to estimate willingness-to-pay  for associated  health effects in Taiwan.
They find elasticities  of willingness-to-pay  of 1/3, and also report this to be consistent with some
findings from the United States (note that the public good in this context is associated health
effects, presumably a subset of all associated effects). Other studies of willingness-to-pay  and
income in developing countries  are not known, and elasticities  of 1 are often implicitly assumed in
transfers of estimates from other countries.  Partial indirect evidence can be found in studies that
have estimated "environmental Kuznetz curves": Grossman and Krueger (1995) and Selden and
6Song (1994) both find air pollution eventually to fall with GDP growth. This empirical tendency
presumably reflects changes both in costs and benefits of environmental protection as income
grows. It lends support to the hypothesis  that willingness-to-pay  increases with income, however,
since it indicates that the benefits of environmental  improvements  eventually increase sufficiently
to justify increasing  environmental  quality.
To  summarize, theory would indicate elasticities of willingness-to-pay for air quality
greater than zero  (normal goods), and possibly greater than one  (luxury goods). Based on
theoretical reasoning, values close to  zero can be  judged  implausible, since one  compares
households with widely differing scarcity of market goods that for this reason has very different
ability to pay. Moreover, scant empirical evidence can hardly be seen as sufficient to rule out the
possibility  that elasticities  of willingness-to-pay  may exceed one.
2. A Welfare Function Approach to Public Goods Provision
The General Framework
Household utility and consumption. We shall use the words household and individual
synonymously.'" Let-  household h's  utility,  uh = uh (xh,  d),  depend on the consumption  of n market
goods,  Xh  =Xh,...,Xh,  and pollution concentrations, d.  For notational simplicity, we  assume
uniform mixing of pollution, and will later generalize to the case in which households  experience
differing pollution levels. We furthermore  assume that the number of agents polluting the area is
large, so that pollution can be modeled as exogenous to the household. Consumption  of market
goods is chosen by the household to maximize  uh  given lump-sum income, Ih,  pollution, and
prices,  p,,...,  p,,.  We assume separability in preferences  between pollution  and market  goods,  so
that the household's preferences  for an unpolluted environment  are not influenced by the relative
prices among market goods. The indirect utility function expresses household h's  utility as a
function of prices,  pollution, and income:
(1)  v  (p,I  ,d)=uh(fh(P,Ih),d),
where  xh  =  fh  (p,  Jh)  is a set of Marshallian demand functions and  Vh / ad =  uh  / ad,  by the
envelope  theorem.
Technology  of production and pollution abatement. We assume that pollution abatement
technologies  can be employed in a polluting production  process or embodied in the product itself.
Abatement  reduces  pollutant  emissions  per unit of output,  but also increases  the cost of the product.
Examples of  abatement in  production processes are  sulfur scrubbers and  filters on
smokestacks,  wastewvater  treatment plants, or alternative, less polluting processes. Examples of
10  Becker's "rotten  kid theorem"  provides  an introduction  to conditions  under which-in this way-we  can allow
welfare  analysis  to abstract  from problems  of intrahousehold  distribution  (see  Bergstrom  1989).
7abatement embodied in consumption  goods are unleaded gasoline, catalytic converters and other
improvements  in cars, or nonphosphate  detergents. We do not ignore the possibility that pollution
can be reduced without costs, but we shall reserve our parameter denoting abatement, aj, for the
more  analytically  relevant efforts  that reduce emissions  further,  at a real cost.
For all goodsj  = I,..,n, we describe costs by a function that satisfies  the usual regularity
conditions:
(2)  c  (aj,xj),  with  &jc/  xj  >0,  t92cj/  xX2  20,  2(0,xj)/daj  =0,  cj/eaj  >0.
The generalizations  here are for analytical  convenience.  There may be sectors that are at the outset
nonpolluting:  they are here described  as sectors for which emissions reach an insignificant  level at
a miniscule cost of abatement. Similarly,  polluting sectors for which no abatement technology is
available are here described as yielding only insignificant  reductions in emissions even at high
abatement,  with the consequence  that emissions  are not abated to any significant  extent.
We integrate  this structure  in a simple model with fixed coefficients of transformation,  by
letting the transformation  coefficient  in each sector be determined by abatement, but independent
of output:
(3)  cj(a-,x-)=c.(a-)x-
Society's resource  constraint  is:
(4)  ,  cj(aj)  X=  0.
heH
It is possible, of course, to think of a wide range of goods and services  as nonpolluting,  and
for these abatement will of course be zero. To suit convention in the public finance literature, it
would be natural to choose such a good as the numeraire  good (its price of one could thereby be
held constant  throughout  the exercise).
We shall later introduce  the possibility  that a pollution control strategy influences costs for
a range of goods rather than for one good. In that case, the pattern of cost change is determined by
the domain of the policy and by repercussions  through intermediate  deliveries  between sectors. As
an example, a transportation  pollution control strategy can be limited in domain to passenger
transport, or it can be applied to transport more generally.  In the latter case, it increases costs of
nontransport  goods and services as well, according  to the use of transportation  as an input, directly
and indirectly,  in the various sectors.  To simplify  presentation  in this analytical section,  we assume
that a pollution control strategyj increases  the cost of goodj only.
We shall  assume that consumers  face prices equal to marginal  costs:
(S)  pj  = cj(aj)
8so that there are no taxes or subsidies  in the economy.'"
Pollution.  Pollution  concentration  is a function  of total pollutant  emissions  in area,
(6)  d = d(e), e = EXJXh  ej(aj)x>
where ej (a, ) is the emission  coefficient for goodj when the technology is aj.  We make the usual
regularity  assumptions,  and assume  &ee  / aaj < 0 for ei > 0 .
Policy instruments.  An important  topic in environmental  economics  has been the choice of
policy instrument  and our treatment here is very brief (discussions  are found in Baumol and Oates
1988 or in Eskeland and Jimenez 1992, for an emphasis on developing countries). Abatement in
any sector may clearly be induced  either with regulation  (say emission  standards)  or with taxes, and
the essence of our modeling is that in either case  the costs will accrue to the consumers facing  price
increases  for their consumption  goods.  There is an important  shortcoming  of our analysis,  however,
if one assumes  that abatement is induced  by revenue-yielding  instruments,  such as emission  taxes,
or auctioned emission permnits.  In this case, one would complement our analysis with the income
distribution  effects for the proceeds,  say through changes in public expenditures.  As is highlighted
in public finance texts and in the recent literature on green (and double) dividends, the use of the
proceeds from environmental  taxes should be subject to standard public finance principles. As
shown in Sandmo (1975),  optimal environmental  taxes eliminate  distortionary  taxation if they raise
exactly  what is needed for public budgets.
While instruments  and control strategies could be sector-neutral,  our analysis covers more
specific strategies, leaving more instruments in the tool-chest. In the empirical section, we first
analyze strategies addressing  emissions from household consumption  of energy and transportation
services directly. Subsequently,  we analyze strategies influencing all stages of production and
consumption.
A welfare  function.  We want an analytical  framework  allowing  variation in how one values
one  individual's change in utility compared to  that of  another. For this,  we use a  welfare
function  w(v ,V2,...,vH  ) defined over  each  individual's utility. We  assume the  planner sets
abatement in each sector (for instance directly  by emission  standards)  to maximize social welfare.
With constant returns to scale and prices equal to marginal  costs  (5), society's resource  constraint
(4) is satisfied (it is tlhe sum of private budget constraints, which are behind the indirect utility
functions). We also use  (6), describing how abatement influences pollution. In optimum, the
marginal  welfare effect of abatement  in each sector  equals  zero:
(7)  _  =  h  _ xh  &cj  +  LVhl  Vh  dd 1  , all j s J
da,  h.H  L  a  a  Ad  al  )  da 
If there  are  taxes  and subsidies  in the  economy,  then  environmental  policies  will influence  net tax proceeds
through  resulting  changes  in equilibrium  demands.  This is treated  in Sandmo  (1975),  in the recent  "double
dividend"  literature  (see,  for instance,  Goulder  1994,  and in Eskeland  1996).  General  insights  are limited  to
contexts  in which  the  tax  structure  is  optimal  under  specified  objectives  and  constraints.
9where  we  have  used  Roy's  identity,  avh  ,a  = -x1&v  //  al.  Also,  we  have  introduced
simplifying  notation for the marginal value to the planner of increasing household h's disposable
income,
aVh  aih
and J is the set of possible abatement  strategies  (for instance  the set of polluting goods and services,
if strategies  are output-based).
Inside the brackets of (7) are the net benefits accruing to household h, with the first term
describing  the control costs accruing to household  h. These are proportional  to h's consumption  of
good j,  and the proportionality  factor is the increase in the good's unit cost. The second term
describes  benefits associated  with a marginal unit of abatement,  in terms of  h's willingness-to-pay
for pollution (i.e., the willingness-to-pay  for pollution reductions, but with the opposite sign).' 2
Since  the welfare function  represents  a weighted sum of net benefits  to households,  we may use the
term welfare  weights for the /hhs.
Efficiency.  If the planner has available instruments  for costless transfers of income between
households,  then all the social welfare weights will be equalized. Then, it is not attractive to let
redistributive objectives influence the use of other instruments, such as environmental policies.
Since  potential compensation  via costless transfers can underpin  the use of social welfare weights
that are uniform across individuals,  analysis  which uses uniform  weights is often described  as using
the compensation  criterion  (for an exposition,  see Varian 1984, page 169).
With uniform  welfare weights,  the optimality  condition (7) simplifies  to:
(8)  C  a/v  h  d  _=Xj
he:H Ad  Ida  j  heH  aa
To see that  (8) represents the  Samuelson condition for optimal provision of a  public good
(Samuelson  1954), notice that the right-hand side is the marginal cost of abatement (j/1aj  is the
marginal increase in unit cost for good  j).  The marginal cost of environmental  improvements is
obtained on the right-hand side when dividing by the marginal effect on the pollution indicator
(ddldaj).
Consideration  of the distribution  of costs and benefits.  Assume  now that we start our policy
assessment  at a point where aggregate  marginal  benefits equal aggregate  marginal costs (i.e., using
uniform  weights, as in equation 8), and ask what is the marginal effect of aj on welfare under an
alternative  set of welfare weights lI:
(9)  ~~~  ~~dw  [C  a Vh  dd  _haC
(9)  - Ef13hL  _/V)_  h  ].
daj  heH  A  d  AIda  daaj
2 To see  that  willingness-to-pay  is  MailAlh,  totally  differentiate  vh,  set  dvh=O,  and  solve  for  dlh/dd.
10We may subtract (8) from (9) to check whether  a marginal increase  in strategyj is attractive  under
the welfare  weights ,:
dw
(I1O"  - = 
dai
(11)  heli  ,ad  dI  (d  al
H  <~~~~~~ H(aV/av)  id  0
where the bars denote averages over households  and H is the number of households.  In (11), we
have divided by equation (8).
The right-hand expression is the distributional characteristic for good j.  Distributional
characteristics  are used in tax incidence analysis:  the greater a good's distributional  characteristic
the more will its tax proceeds be collected from lower-income  households.,,  The left-hand term is
an analogous  characteristic  for a public good: the pollution  reduction benefits.  When comparing  the
distributional  characteristics  for private and public goods,  we may note that a vector of quantities  in
the former has been replaced by a vector of values in the latter. This asymmetry reflects the fact
that for a private good, the price is given exogenously  to the household,  and household preferences
are reflected in the quantities they choose. For a public good, in contrast, the quantity is given
exogenously  to the household,  and household  preferences.  are reflected in their willingness-to-pay.
Proposition:  Startingfrom a point at which aggregate  marginal benefits equal aggregate
marginal  costs  for control strategyj, a welfare  function would ask that more of a strategy
be applied if and only if the distributional characteristic of the benefits exceed the
distributional  characteristic  of the costs, and vice versa. (The proof is given above).
Another way of stating this result is that additional  (less) pollution control  with strategyj is
attractive  when the welfare weights have a greater (lower) covariance  with the marginal benefits
than with the control  costs.
Notice that we can also compare the right-hand  side of (11) for different pollution control
strategies, in effect checking whether one strategy can be  strengthened relative to another to
redistribute  control costs, keeping  pollution  constant.
Generalization.  Policy affects a range of prices, and  people experience  diferent pollution
levels.  These generalizations  are quite intuitive,  and we limit the exposition  to the results. For the
first generalization, we denote a pollution control strategy by ak (where k is not necessarily a
commodity)  and let the cost implications  faced by consumer  h be described  by  xh  X'  dc,/dak.
13  Distributional  characteristics  for private  goods are shown  to be useful in tax analysis  under general  welfare
functions  (Feldstein  1972,  page 33). Besley  and Kanbur  (1988) show how simpler  measures,  such as the poors'
share  in a good's  aggregate  consumption,  can be useful  when  poverty  measures  are used.
11For exposure levels that differ among  households,  we have a case with provision  of the public good
varying by area. The policy relevant generalization is when pollution levels in different areas
unavoidably  are addressed by the same policy lever, as when pollution drifts across boundaries,  or
when one emission standard applies to cars in several areas. In other cases, the above conditions
can be used for each area individually.  We give the pollution indicator  an individual  superscript  h
to specify  the public good provision  experienced  by household  h.
The modified Samuelson  condition  and the analogue  to equation (11) are, respectively:
(12)  d  (  h  hj=  Xj
dak  2:  xdak
dw
(13)  da  =  -
dak
Ej3lh-V*h  aVhddh  >S  8v"dd  Xh  (  hdc_
heH  tad  ajh )  dak  ta 1 d  8I  da,  _  heH  ) dak
av/vdd  j:n  -dc  H  _,_  <  HxJ (ad  l  -a)  <a  j=  J dak
T'he  distributional  characteristics  in this case are associated with a particular strategy k, and how
this strategy  influences  the provision of the public good and the costs of private goods, respectively.
Income levels and willingness-to-pay.  We are interested  in how the willingness-to-pay  for
environmental  improvements  vary with household income and suppress individual  superscripts,  for
simplicity:
8 (8v)  ~3I,'  ~a2V &v  +  Ov  a2v
(14)  ad  Al  adaI aI  ad  da2  a2v  a2V
as  (/a~i)2 84  - adaj  av/ad  a  812  8av/8
In the latter expression, we have introduced a term for the elasticity of willingness-to-pay  with
respect to income,{  Z . The two expressions on the right-hand side in the latter equation are
themselves elasticities with respect to  income. The first describes the marginal disutility of
pollution as it changes with income, the latter the marginal utility of income as it changes with
income. Equation (14) illustrates clearly the  logic behind one method proposed in incidence
analysis: By assuming  that the effect of the public good on utility does not vary with income (i.e.,
12a2v / adaI  = 0), one can associate  all variation  in willingness-to-pay  with variation in the marginal
utility of income (i.e., due  to a
2
v  1 aI2  ).14
Specifying Functional Forms for Empirical  Application
Preferences. As  stated earlier, we assume that preferences are separable between the
consumption  of market goods and pollution, d, and we let  Y(I,p) be an indirect subutility function
defined over the consumption  possibilities  for market goods. We propose a simple functional form
allowing  parametric  variation in ^,:
(15)  v(I, p,d) =,  v-dV/"'  =  v(IJp)(1 -dy,(I,p)a-
Utility equals the value of the subutility  function  F(I,p)  when the pollution indicator  d is zero. The
non-negative pollution indicator is calibrated such that pollution 'removes' part of (not all) the
utility that money would otherwise  buy.' 5 For the willingness-to-pay  for pollution reductions, we
have:
"Iv  'Iv  (a+l)
(16)
ad  I8  - d(a
To represent  preferences,  the material consequence  is how a utility function  ranks a vector
I,p,d. The separability  assumption  ensures  that monotone  transformations  of  Fand d will not affect
the ranking of consuimption  possibilities, described by I,p. Such transformations  do, however, in
combination  with the parameter a, affect the marginal rate of substitution  between market goods
and pollution reductions. Thus, we may fix V and use a to describe the relationship  between the
valuation of the public good and consumption  possibilities  for market goods. For T1  we choose the
indirect compensation  function, VI(q,p,I)  = e(q,v(p,I)), where e is the expenditure function. The
indirect compensation  function describes  how much money one needs at prices q to be as well off
as if facing prices p  with income 1. With respect to p and I, the indirect compensation  function
behaves like an indirect  utility function, and has the advantage  that it is defined exclusively  over
observable  arguments  (Varian 1984).  We have: OTI/Cpj  =  /&  = -x 1, cY/t5=  &/Y&/
1 and:
(17)  ---  l-  ,and
14 See  Aaron  and  McGuire  (1970),  Maital  (1972),  and  Johnson  (1980)  for an environmental  application.
15 We  assume  d < 1.  Then,  pollution  reduces  household  utility  by  a positive  share  less  than  one  for  all households,
as  long  as a <  0, i.e.,  as long  as  air  quality  is not  a luxury  good  (below).  We  also  make  policy  simulations  with  a =
I (or 4wTp,i  = 2), and  then  check  that  even  the  richest  have  positive  utility  and  positive  marginal  utility  of income.
The  latter  restriction,  I-d(l+a)Iha>0,  is  the  stricter  of the  two.
13(18)  =1+  a
Marginal utility of income equals one if there  is no pollution and will be close to one in most of the
cases we discuss.- 6
The  pollution  indicator.  Let air pollution concentrations  be modeled as quadratic in total
emissions per square kilometer in the area, A. This indicator satisfies two reasonable requirements:
First, the indicator does not change if areas with the same emissions per square kilometer are joined
to together  or studied  separately. Second, emission reductions reduce the pollution  indicator more
the higher are emissions per square kilometer.'7
(19)  2  A)
where k is a scaling factor used to calibrate the damages from pollution.
For the effect of abatement  strategy j  on emissions, we make the simplifying  assumption
that abatement does not influence the demand for the pollution  good. This simplification  does not
influence  the  substance  of our  analysis,  since we  calibrate  the  aggregate  net  benefits  for  each
strategy to be zero as a starting point for our analysis (using equation 8). A similar simplification is
not used in the analysis of control costs, because the envelope  theorem  in that case  allows us to
ignore demand responsiveness. The marginal effect of strategy aj on the pollution indicator is:
(20)  dd  ke  de  ke  ae
daj  A  daj  A 2 aa  =6H
The  welfare  function.  Let us choose a constant elasticity welfare function (Atkinson  1970)
for which:
16 The exception  is wealthy  households  when  air quality  is a luxury  good and there is much pollution.  Pollution
will be calibrated  to represent  5 percent  of income  to the median  household  in the most polluted  area,  and we will
tabulate  Swrp,j for households  with  marginal  utility  of income  = 1.
17 This representation  of pollution  concentrations  is merely  meant  to be illustrative.  The important  implication  is
that  the marginal  benefits  of emission  reductions,  ceteris  paribus,  are increasing  in emissions  per square  kilometer.
For empirical  measures  of damages,  a pollution  indicator  would  probably  be convex,  as is ours,  or proportional.
Dose  response  functions  for  health  effects,  for instance,  will often  be proportional  or proportional  after  a threshold
effect, and the latter  would  make a summary  measure  strictly  convex.  In principle,  damage  functions  could also
approach  a concave  shape  at high  pollution  levels  (if enough  damage  is done,  then  there are no additional  damages
from additional  pollution).  While other functional  forms should be tried, our application  yields reasonable
implications:  Dividing  Jakarta  into five sections,  Central  Jakarta  is most  polluted.  We find it plausible  to assume
that, had the exposed  population  been the same, then the marginal  benefits  from emission  reductions  would  be
highest  in Central  Jakarta  due  to the higher  pollution  levels.  A strictly  convex  damage  function  is also  necessary  to
reflect the political  reality of ambient  standards  (and also how most people think about pollution):  urgency of
pollution  reductions  is increasing  in pollution  levels.  Concavity,  while hard to justify for practical  reasons  also,
would have excluded  the possibility  of marginal analysis,  which is exploited  in our paper (see, for instance,
Baumol  and Oates  1988).
14(21)  -=  (Vh
The welfare function is linear in individual  utilities for  E  equal to zero, and transfers to the poor
from the rich are valued increasingly as e approaches infinity. In terms of the welfare effect of
income transfers, we have:
(22)  /J  h  W 3 vh  (Vh )-E  (I  - (1  + a)d  Jh-)
Notice that the public good is a determinant of how useful additional income is to one
household as opposed to another.  Thus, e equal to zero does not make the welfare function neutral
to transfers, even though it will be linear in individual  utility levels. However, for E equal to zero,
all the variation  in the welfare  weights ,Brepresents  differences  among  households  in their valuation
of income transfers due to pollution (and in our empirical analysis  these differences  are minor).
3. Data and Results: The Incidence of Air Pollution Control Policies
SUSENAS 1990 is a household  consumption  survey from the Central Bureau of Statistics
in Indonesia. The survey includes consumption  items as "expenditure" even when no purchase is
involved (such as own production of food and fuel), and total household expenditure therefore
provides a  good income-proxy for purposes of welfare analysis. On Java, a  total  of  16,328
households have  completed inforrnation on  expenditures and  income,  including details  on
household energy and transportation consumption. Our analysis is concentrated on Jakarta, for
which the data allowed subdivision in five administrative areas, or Kabupatens: South, North,
Central, East, and West. We also report results including "rest of Java" to examine the effects of
strategies that include large rural communities.  Data on population  (1990 census) and area are also
from the Bureau of Statistics.  For the results on control strategies  that include productive sectors, a
1985 input-output table is used. Emission coefficients are from Weaver and Reale (1994), and
Eskeland, Jimenez and Liu (1998).
Distributional  Characteristics of Costsfor  Strategies Addressing  Emissionsfrom  Consumption
In this section we compare the distribution of abatement costs for altemative control
strategies. As explained earlier this can be done by comparing distributional characteristics for
different pollution goods (the right-hand  side of equation I1) or more complex strategies (the right-
hand side of equation 13).  This provides the incidence  analysis  that complements  cost-effectiveness
analysis, i.e., when targeted pollution reduction are exogenously  set (for instance because little is
known about benefits).
Consumption activities that contribute directly to emissions at the household level are
mainly household energy use and passenger transportation.  As is seen in Table 1, expenditure
shares are rising with income for transport, and declining with income for energy. By implied
i5income  elasticities, private  and public transportation  represent luxury  goods, while  energy  is less
income elastic."'
Table 1: Household Expenditure Sharesa
Jakarta  Rest of Java
Transport  Energy  Transport  Energy
Private  Public  Private  Public
Quintile lb  0.0  2.4  12.5  0.2  1.2  10.9
Quintile 2  0.0  5.8  9.0  0.4  1.3  9.1
Quintile 3  0.0  6.8  8.3  0.8  1.5  8.0
Quintile 4  0.3  7.6  7.9  1.7  2.0  7.0
Quintile 5  3.1  6.2  6.5  4.8  2.6  5.7
a. Greater  detail  shown  in Annex  Table  2.
b. The quintiles  are, throughout,  "Java-quintiles,"  and a household's  total expenditure  is used as proxy for
income.
To make income levels by quintile comparable, 'Java quintiles'  have been used throughout,
whether  the  area  is  Java,  Jakarta,  or  rest  of  Java." 9 For  transport,  we  may  note  that  Jakarta
households  at all income levels have higher expenditure  shares for public transport  and lower for
private  transport  than  households  from  the  rest  of  Java.  For  energy  consumption,  patterns  of
expenditure  are quite similar in Jakarta and rest of Java.
Table 2 shows the distributional characteristics for control costs from consumption-oriented
transport- and energy strategies. As shown in the previous section, distributional  characteristics  can
be thought  of as welfare-weighted  cost  measures,  and give  good  insight  into how  the  planner's
assessment  of control strategies  is affected by an increased priority  for transfers  to the poor.  The
distributional  characteristics  shown here  (the parameter  of inequality  aversion  e  increasing  from
one  to  two  compare)  with  distributional  characteristics  of one  that  would  prevail  with  a  linear
welfare  function,  or  E  equal  to  zero  (this  statement  is an  approximation  in  the  presence  of
pollution). 20
18  Estimated  demand systems with price elasticities  would be useful in welfare calculation  for discrete price
changes,  but would have to be differentiated  by income group to be useful in the context of this study. For
marginal  analysis,  performed  here, such parameter  estimates  are not required.  Deaton's  method  for estimation  of
demand  parameters  exploiting  spatial  variation  was attempted,  but with generally  unconvincing  results  for more
complex  demand  systems. Estimated  income  elasticities  performed  better,  but do not add much to the analysis
when  it can  be based  on large  samples  of household  budgets,  as is ours.
19Income  levels  are higher in urban areas, but many prices are lower  in rural areas,  a difference  we do not take
account  of here.  Ravallion  and van de Walle  (1991)  suggest  the cost of living  may be about 10 percent  higher in
urban  areas,  for consumption  baskets  applicable  in  the vicinity  of the poverty  line.
20 When  reflected  in policy,  aversion  to inequality  will result  either  in costly  transfers  (as  here)  or in equalization  of
incomes.  Thus, our sensitivity  analysis  with respect to inequality  aversion  can also be interpreted  as sensitivity
analysis  with respect  to the marginal  cost of making  transfers.  We may illustrate  the effects of our parametric
variation as follows: At e=  1, the marginal social valuation of  income to the poorest quintile is 7  times that to the
highest  quintile.  At e= 2, the corresponding  figure  is 45 (see  Annex  Table  4).
16Table 2. Distributional Characteristics of Control Costs
Jakarta  Java
= 1  e=2  = I  e=2
Total energy  0.72  0.55  0.72  0.55
Total  transport  0.61  0.39  0.32  0.12
Throughout,  the distributional  characteristic  for the energy strategy is higher than for the
transport strategy. This reflects the fact that energy expenditures increase less with income than
expenditures  on transport (see Table 1, and Annex Tables 1 and 2 for more detail). Thus, a reduced
concern for wealthier consumers reduces the weighted incidence of costs for the transportation
relative to the energy strategy. This means that if one introduces redistributive  objectives in the
choice of control strategy  when merely looking  at the distribution  of control  costs, it will strengthen
the transport strategyy,  and scale back the energy strategy. Such a reallocation of abatement efforts
could be made in a way holding total pollution constant, justifying the somewhat higher total
abatement costs with the implied  transfer  of control costs from poorer to wealthier  households.  This
distribution-motivated  preference  for transportation  control strategy  is even stronger if one studies a
control program  for all of Java, rather than  just Jakarta.
As one might expect, a similar difference exists between control strategies for private
transport and public transport (Table 3). Expenditure shares for private transport are rising more
sharply with income than they do for public transport, so a reallocation  of abatement efforts from
public to private transport  would benefit the poor.
Table 3: Distributional Characteristics  of Control Costs, Transport Strategies
Jakarta  Java
eF=]  e=2  I  2
Public  transport  0.80  0.59  0.41  0.18
Private  transport  0.37  0.14  0.21  0.07
At this poinit,  it may be worth comparing results with findings from the United States.
Harrison (1977) found that control costs for private car strategies would hurt poor households,
particularly in rural areas. Several stylized facts can explain much of the contrast to Java: (i) due to
a higher general income level, car ownership  reached farther into low-income  groups in the United
States in the seventies  than in Indonesia  in the nineties; (ii) in the United States, rural population
densities are lower, and self-sufficiency  in rural communities is lower, so poor rural households
depend more on cars for mobility than on Java. Quite likely, private and public transport are not
luxury goods in richer countries,  whereas on Java we find both to be, in the sense that expenditure
shares are increasing  in total expenditures.  Importantly,  public transport in this data set represents  a
broad aggregate,  likely including luxurious  modes such as taxis and plane trips. Thus, it may be the
case that expenditure shares for more narrowly defined public services such as tricycle taxis, bus
and minibus travel decline with income. These questions,  and therefore some more detailed policy
problems, cannot be answered with this type of empirical data. For instance, strategies increasing
the costs of new cars will probably hurt the poor less than strategies affecting  old cars and the fuel
17cost element. Similarly, buy-back programs that get old cars voluntarily off the street benefit
owners of old cars, hurting  those that would by them (and those who fund the buy-backs). 2'
Table 4 shows the effect of inequality  aversion  on more narrowly  defined energy strategies.
For some fuels, the weighted incidence  of control  costs is hardly  diminished by inequality  aversion,
showing that these to a great extent are used also by lower-income  households. In Jakarta, coal,
firewood and  kerosene are relatively important for the poor.  When strategies for  Java  are
considered, coal and kerosene do not play such an important  role in the consumption  basket of the
poor. 22
Table 4: Distributional Characteristics of Control Costs, Energy Strategies
Jakarta  Java
E=l  e=2  =1  2
Electricity  0.61  0.42  0.43  0.22
Coal  1.32  1.36  0.72  0.42
Firewood  1.07  0.96  1.00  0.89
Kerosene  1.00  0.92  0.74  0.54
Gas  0.39  0.14  0.17  0.03
Total  energy  0.72  0.55  0.72  0.55
Electricity and gas (including piped and bottled gas) are luxury goods, so strategies for
these have smaller distributional  characteristics. Thus, electricity  and gas strategies  would receive
increased relative emphasis if control programs were modified with redistributive objectives in
mind. 23 For electricity, as in the case for car ownership, we probably see an effect markedly
different  from what one would observe  in wealthier  countries,  where electricity connections  and car
ownership reach farther down in the income distribution. Commodities  with threshold effects like
these allow incidence patterns to vary greatly between countries at different income levels (see
Berndt and Samaniego 1984).
21 Concerns  for income distribution  often  influence  arguments  over control  strategies.  One-day  driving  bans are
often  popular  for their alleged  'fairness' (Eskeland  and Feyzioglu  1997).  'An.argument  behind  buyback  programs
(always  small  in scale) and grandfathering  clauses  for old vehicles  is that they shield  households  one would  not
want to hurt with  additional  costs.  For car strategies,  examples  of the greater  detail  of alternatives  available  can be
found  in Harrison  (1977)  and Eskeland  (1994).
22 Pitt (1985)  also  finds  that  kerosene,  coal and  firewood  are not luxury  goods  on Java.
23 For electricity,  pollution  is associated  with  generation  (we assume  50 percent  is coal fired  power,  fifty  percent  is
clean,  see Eskeland  et al. 1998).  This  in contrast  to other  "polluting  goods,"  where pollution  literally  is associated
with  their  consumption.  This  perspective  is the relevant  one if the costs  of making  electricity  production  cleaner  are
passed on to households  according  to consumption.  Even for gas,'  a relatively  clean fuel, policies  making  its use
more expensive  could be chosen to make it cleaner (mandating  cleaner stoves, for instance, or addressing
leakages).  If the policy considered  is subsidies  to induce substitution  to gas as a cleaner fuel, the income
distribution  argument  is reversed:  as the fuel is mostly  used by wealthier  households,  poor households  would  not
benefit  much from the transfer  effect of the subsidy  (for such instruments,  incidence  analysis for the funding
mechanism  is also  warranted).
18Distributional  Impact of Net Benefits, Consumption-Oriented  Strategies
Control strategies applied to Jakarta. As emphasized  in the analytical section, analysis of
distributional implications should focus on the distribution of control costs and benefits. Our
modeling of benefits has two important limitations. First, we want to be able to  link control
strategies  to improvements  in air quality experienced  by households.  Our approach  here has been to
focus on Jakarta as a  polluted area, on emissions from polluting goods as services, and on
residential location  as determinant  of exposure.  The SUSENAS  survey data allows the localization
of households  to the five Kabupatens  of Jakarta (Central,  North, East, South and West), as well as
rest of Java. Treating the surveyed  households  as representative  for the population in each area, a
pollution indicator for each area was created. 24 Table 5 shows some summary  statistics for the six
areas.
Second, there is great uncertainty about the extent to which the willingness-to-pay for
pollution reductions increases  with household income. We rely extensively  on sensitivity analysis
with respect to this parameter. We shall view a unitary income elasticity as a central case of
reference,  the one for which a households  exposed  to the same  pollution levels would be willing to
pay the same share of their income for a given ambient improvement.  Notable features of the
unitary income elasticity are: (i) a  large proportion of total benefits are received by wealthier
households  and (ii)  total benefits are invariant  to redistribution  of incomes.
Table 5: Summary Statistics, Jakarta and Java
Coefficient  of
Ilousehold  variation  Population  Pollution
mean  (percent  Population  density  Pollution  Value,  (percent
incomea  income)  (thousand)  (pers/km2)  Indicator  incomeb
Central  Jakarta  294  78  1,075  21,939  1.00  5.00
North Jakarta  377  120  1,362  8,966  0.31  1.56
East  Jakarta  297  78  2,064  10,981  0.33  1.65
South  Jakarta  338  64  1,905  13,050  0.47  2.34
West  Jakarta  346  64  1,820  14,106  0.68  3.41
Rest of Java  117  95  100,547  783  0.03  0.13
a.  A  household's  total  expenditure  is used  as proxy  for  income  (thousand  rupiah  per  month).
b. Pollution  value  is calibrated  to five percent  of incomes  in the most  polluted  areas  (Central  Jakarta).  Elasticity  of
willingness-to-pay  is assumed  to  be one  in  this  table.
24 The indicator  is calculated  as follows:  total use of each fuel in the area is calculated  as total use by the
households  surveyed  multiplied  by the ratio of the area's population  to the surveyed  population.  A fuel-specific
emission  factor represents  particulate  emissions,  or dust, the pollutant  of greatest  concern  in Jakarta (see Ostro
1994; Weaver and Reale 1994).  Total area emissions  per square kilometer  are then calculated  for each area
(Equation  6). The pollutant  indicator  (Equation  19) is calibrated  to reduce  the utility of the median  household  in
Central  Jakarta,  the most polluted  area, by 5 percent.  This  primitive  indicator  abstracts  from multiple  pollutants,
background  levels,  variation  within  areas  and dispersion  between  areas. The representation  of Jakarta  as radically
more  polluted  than  a population-weighted  average  for the rest of Java  appears  reasonable,  as does  the relative
ranking  of  the  five  Kabuipatens  in Jakarta.  The  treatment  of "rest  of Java"  as one  region  is in part  motivated  by the
fact  that  Surabaya,  the  second  largest  city,  was  absent  from  the  data  set.
19Similarly, low income elasticities would imply that pollution damages reduce the utility
levels of poor  households quite dramatically, if  total pollution damages are to  represent a
significant  share of total income. In our calculations,  we calibrate environmental  damages  to reduce
the utility levels of the median household in Central Jakarta by 5 percent (the most polluted area,
see the last two columns).  Under the assumption  of unitary  4,  air pollution reduces utility levels
for all households in Central Jakarta by five percent. If the income elasticity is reduced  to one half,
in contrast,  the poorest quintile in the area will have its utility level reduced by 7.6 percent due to
pollution, and at 4,,  =  0.1,  by 10.5  percent (Annex  Table 3).
Table 6 shows  the distributional  characteristics  of costs and benefits  of energy and transport
strategies for  Jakarta. For parameter values  e  =  1,  ,  =  1,  we  will  find  distributional
characteristics  for control costs of 0.72 for energy and 0.61 for transport, as in Table 2. The
distributional  characteristics  of the benefits  are 0.72 and 0.71, respectively,  so that the distributional
characteristic  for net benefits is zero for energy and positive  transport. Given these parameters  the
redistributive objectives result  in  neutrality on  the  margin to  the  energy  strategy, and  a
strengthening  of the transport strategy  (the sign for net benefits is in the third column in each cell).
Positive distributional  characteristics  for net benefits  is more likely for a lower income elasticity of
willingness-to-pay, $,,  since a  lower income elasticity allocates a  greater proportion of the
benefits to poorer household.  Variation  in 4,  has only an insignificant  effect on the distributional
characteristics  of control costs, through the marginal utility of income. Thus, there is a general
tendency for the distributional  characteristics  of net benefits  to be positive towards the right in the
tables.
Table 6: Distributional  Characteristics,  Costs and Benefits,  Jakartaa
2 ~  ~  w,1  0.ww025  4r.  IOJ
C  B  Net  C  B  Net  C  B  Net  C  B  Net  C  B  Net
E =i
Total  energy  0.71  0.30  - 0.72  0.72  0  0.71  0.87  +  0.71  0.95  +  0.71  0.99  +
All  tmnsport  0.60  0.31  - 0.61  0.71  +  0.61  0.86  +  0.60  0.94  +  0.60  0.99  +
E =  1
Total  energy  0.55  0.15  - 0.55  0.53  - 0.55  0.73  +  0.54  0.85  +  0.54  0.93  +
All  transport  0.39  0.16  - 0.39  0.52  +  0.38  0.73  +  0.38  0.84  +  0.37  0.92  +
a. Each cell in the table assumes a parameter for the income elasticity of willingness-to-pay for pollution reductions, and for the
inequality aversion of the welfare function. A plus (minus) highlights that the distributional characteristic of benefits, B, is
greater (smaller) than that for costs, C, so that the strategy would be strengthened  under those distributional weights.
At low elasticities  of willingness-to-pay  (to the right in the table) inequality  aversion would
lead to a strengthening  of both strategies,  while both would be scaled back if pollution reduction is
a luxury good (4,  = 2). For unitary g,,  there are interesting  differences between the strategies,
however. Here, distributional  concerns would lead us to reduce the emphasis on emission control
from household energy  use, but increase  the emphasis  on transportation  control strategies.  Thus, the
tendency observed in Table 2, which reflect steeper Engel curves for transport  than for energy, are
also important  in net benefit assessments.
We may observe that the two strategies are almost identical in terms of the distributional
characteristics  of benefits, so an incidence analysis limited to control costs would be sufficient if
only the balance  between the two strategies were the subject of analysis.  What net benefit analysis
20adds is the possibility of identifying  the range in which redistributive  objectives  would raise the
optimal  air quality (s,  = 0.5 or smaller)  or reduce it (4.,, = 2 or larger).
Control strategies  applied uniformly  across Java. What would the results be if strategies
had to be applied uniformly  across Java? First, note that it is always desirable, from an efficiency
point of view, to reduce emissions only from sources  that cause air quality problems. On the other
hand, for administrative  or other reasons, some strategies can only be implemented uniformly
across a greater area, in this case assumed to be the entire island of Java. 25 Again, we assume that
such strategies are pursued until the point where aggregate  marginal  benefits equal marginal costs
before we turn to tlhe  implications  of introducing  inequality  aversion,  using e = 1 and 2 (Table 7).
Table 7: Distributional  Characteristics, Costs and Benefits,  Java
4,  w7  = 2  4wrP  =I  w  =  rpK  5  wrp,=0.25  VwrpJ0.I
C  B  Net  C  B  Net  C  B  Net  C  B  Net  C  B  Net
E= 1
Total  energy  0.72  0.11  - 0.72  0.26  - 0.72  0.33  - 0.72  0.36  - 0.72  0.38  -
All transport  0.32  0.11  - 0.32  0.26  - 0.32  0.32  0  0.32  0.36  +  0.32  0.38  +
e  =  1
Total energy  0.55  0.02  - 0.55  0.07  - 0.55  0.10  - 0.55  0.11  - 0.55  0.13  -
All transport  0.12  0.02  - 0.12  0.07  - 0.12  0.09  - 0.12  0.11  +  0.12  0.13  +
The important  difference introduced  when households  outside Jakarta are affected by the
strategy is the many poorer, rural households.  They experience  very small benefits since they are
exposed to very low pollution levels. 26 The fact that.  most of these poor households  are unlikely to
benefit is reflected in the Table 7; no strategy  would be strengthened  by inequality  aversion  unless
4,,, is 0.25 or smaller.  Furthernore, energy strategies  would be scaled back, even for 4",  as low as
10  percent.
Table 8 provides net benefit analysis for more narrowly defined transportation strategies,
and some tendencies are intuitive. First, control strategies for private transport are favored by
redistributive objectives for a greater range of parameters than strategies for public transport.
Second, strategies in a Jakarta program are more likely to be favored by inequality  aversion than
strategies in a Java program. Two new observations:  At  e = 2, a private transport strategy for
Jakarta is favored  by redistributive  objectives  even when $,  is as high as two. In a Java program,
S,  would have to be lower for a private transport program to be favored by inequality aversion,
since Engel curves for private transport are not so steep outside Jakarta. Also, in a Java program,
public transport  strategies would be scaled back by redistributive  objectives  even ifor  4,  as low as
1  0 percent.
25 Emission  standards  for  cars  must  for practical  reasons  be uniform  for  large  areas,  such as Denmark  or California.
Fuel-oriented  strategies  and inspection  and maintenance  programs  are also costly to  differentiate  by  area,
administratively,  but may be implemented  for a large  metropolitan  area such as Los Angeles  or Mexico  City (see,
Harrison  1977;  Eskeland  and Devarajan  1996). Even for large point sources,  emission  standards  are, perhaps
unnecessarily,  often  national  in scope.
26 Of course,  households  in rural as well as urban areas  may be exposed  to indoor  air pollution.  We focus on
outdoor  air  pollution  because  a public  good  gives  an obvious  case  for  policy  intervention.
21Table 8: Distributional Characteristics of Net Benefits, Transport Strategies
SwTpj  = 2  C:r,p.l  = I  {5z.1 = 0.5  SWIP  = 0.1
C  B  Net  C  B  Net  C  B  Net  C  B  Net
Jakarta  E  =  1
Private transport  0.36  0.30  - 0.37  0.71  +  0.37  0.87  +  0.37  0.99  +
Public transport  0.79  0.32  - 0.80  0.72  - 0.80  0.86  +  0.79  0.98  +
Jakarta  e = 2
Private transport  0.14  0.15  +  0.14  0.52  +  0.14  0.73  +  0.13  0.92  +
Public  transport  0.59  0.16  - 0.59  0.52  - 0.58  0.73  +  0.57  0.92  +
Java  E  =  I
Private transport  0.24  0.11  - 0.25  0.26  +  0.25  0.32  +  0.25  0.38  +
Publictransport  0.41  0.11  - 0.41  0.26  - 0.41  0.32  - 0.41  0.38  -
Java  e =2
Private transport  0.07  0.02  - 0.07  0.07  0  0.07  0.1  +  0.07  0.13  +
Public  transport  0.17  0.02  - 0.18  0.07  - 0.18  0.09  - 0.18  0.12  -
Table 9 displays more narrowly  defined  energy strategies.  The important  distinctions  in this
table prove to be whether environmental  benefits are luxury goods, and whether or not a program
can be designed  for Jakarta alone. When pollution reduction  benefits are luxury goods (i.e., at 4.
= 2), no energy strategy  is favored  by redistributive  objectives.  For lower elasticities  of willingness-
to-pay (i.e., at  . I,  < 1), control strategies for electricity and gas are favored by redistributive
objectives  in a Jakarta program,  but only the gas strategy  in a Java program.
Table 9: Distributional Characteristics  of Net Benefits, Energy Strategies
,tM'I  = 2  'wM'I  = I  {5wrp.l  = °. S  {Wrpj  = 0.  I
C  B  Net  C  B  Net  C  B  Net  C  B  Net
Jakarta  s  =  I
Electricity  0.60  0.30  - 0.61  0.72  +  0.61  0.87  +  0.60  0.99  +
Coal  10.33  0.33  - 10.32  0.66  - 10.32  0.81  - 10.32  0.94  -
Firewood  10.07  0.33  - 10.07  0.65  - 10.07  0.79  - 10.07  0.91  -
Kerosene  10.00  0.31  - 10.00  0.72  - 10.00  0.87  - 10.00  0.99  -
Gas  0.37  0.30  - 0.39  0.71  +  0.39  0.86  +  0.38  0.98  +
Jakarta E  =2
Electricity  0.41  0.15  - 0.42  0.53  +  0.41  0.74  +  0.40  0.93  +
Coal  10.37  0.16  - 10.36  0.46  - 10.36  0.67  - 10.33  0.89  -
Firewood  0.96  0.16  - 0.96  0.44  - 0.96  0.63  - 0.95  0.82  -
Kerosene  0.92  0.16  - 0.92  0.53  - 0.91  0.74  - 0.90  0.93  +
Gas  0.14  0.15  - 0.14  0.52  +  0.14  0.72  +  0.13  0.91  +
Java  e  = I
Electricity  0.44  0.11  - 0.43  0.26  - 0.44  0.33  - 0.44  0.38  -
Coal  0.72  0.12  - 0.75  0.24  - 0.72  0.30  - 0.71  0.36  0
Firewood  10.00  0.12  - 10.00  0.24  - 10.00  0.31  - 10.00  0.37  0
Kerosene  0.74  0.11  - 0.74  0.27  - 0.74  0.33  - 0.74  0.38  -
Gas  0.16  0.11  - 0.17  0.26  +  0.17  0.32  +  0.17  0.37  +
Java E  = 2
Electricity  0.22  0.02  - 0.22  0.07  - 0.22  0.10  - 0.22  0.13  -
Coal  0.42  0.02  - 0.42  0.06  - 0.42  0.09  - 0.42  0.12  +
Firewood  0.89  0.02  - 0.89  0.06  - 0.89  0.09  - 0.89  0.14  +
Kerosene  0.54  0.02  - 0.54  0.07  - 0.54  0.10  - 0.54  0.13  -
Gas  0.03  0.02  - 0.03  0.07  +  0.03  0.09  +  0.03  0.12  +
22Distributional  aspects  for general strategies  addressing  production  and consumption
Air pollution is caused not only by consumption  activities,  but also by production.  Policies
to control air pollution thus may address production  activities as well, or simply aim for emissions
irrespective  of the kind of polluting activity. Since  sectors deliver goods and services  to each other,
even sectors that are not directly affected may experience cost increases if they use inputs from
sectors that are affected, directly  or indirectly.  Strategies  to reduce emissions from manufacturing,
services and transport  will thus create pattems of price changes  for a range of consumer  goods and
services,  even if a strategy  is designed  to reduce emissions  only from one or a few subsectors.
Our modeling framework  and available data facilitate analysis  of these changes via prices
for consumption goods. Other channels of influence for the distribution of costs could also be
significant, for instance through markets for immobile and heterogenous  factors. We assume that
factor returns are unchanged,  and only trace the consequences  of abatement  strategies  to consumers
(who are endowed  with lump-sum  income)  via prices for goods and services.  These  are modeled by
using an  input-output table to  represent the quantitative impact of  intersectoral transactions.
Through such transactions,  cost increases  for general strategies  will be "spread" across a range of
goods and services,  and thereby be less differentiated  by sector than is the case for consumption
oriented strategies. One would therefore expect the distribution of control costs to be more even,
i.e., more closely related  to the total consumption  expenditures  of each household.
Our first step is to design patterns of sector specific cost increases to represent alternative
abatement strategies.  Three patterns of cost increases  are chosen:
*  Energy strategy: a general rise in the cost of using energy,-
*  Transport  strategy: a general rise in the cost of transport,;
*  Manufacturing strategy:  Sectoral  abatement  costs  as  observed  in  United
States. 27
The energy  strategy  may  be seen  as a mimicking  a  general, sector-neutral  air pollution
control strategy, using energy as a proxy for the costs an industry will have in relation to air
pollution abatement. 28 Alternatively, it may be interpreted as a  strategy directed at emissions
associated with energy  production  and use in the economy.  The transport  strategy is more specific,
addressing transport activities, taking account of the effects on costs among users of transport
services. The manuifacturing  strategy represents a broad and sophisticated  control program for
manufacturing  in a mature phase. 29
To compare the distributional  impact via final consumption,  an intermediate  step uses the
inverted input-output table (I-A)-l to calculate the resulting price increases for a  set of nine
27 Pollution  abatement  costs  are  from  U.S.  Department  of Commerce's  PACE  dataset,  see  Low  (1992).
28 Energy  use is often the basis in emission  models.  See U.S. EPA's AP-42  (1986) on the technical  basis, and
Viscusi  et al. (1994), and Eskeland,  Jimenez  and Liu (1998)  for  use in economic  models.
29 Most sectors  in the United  States  had higher  costs in the initial  years of pollution  control  legislation.  On this
topic,  see Jorgenson  ancd  Wilcoxen  (1990).  Two  aspects  on timing  and maturity  are: The planner  and the polluter
learn  how to design  policies  and how  to reduce  pollution;  pollution  control  is cheaper  for new capital  than when
older  equipment  is to be modified.
23composite commodity groups. The results for each of the three strategies are shown in Table 10.
We may notice that the cost implications for the most important commodity group, food, are
relatively small for all three control strategies.
Next, the effect of such a pattern of price increases  on the cost of the average consumption
basket for each income quintile was calculated. The results are shown in Table I1. For all these
strategies,  the wealthiest  quintile  faces the greatest increases in the cost of its consumption  basket,
not only in absolute terms, but in percent. This result is rather intuitive  when we recall, from Table
10, the modest price increases  for food that the three strategies have in common. Since, according
to Engel's law, the expenditure  shares for nonfood items are increasing  with income, the wealthier
use a higher share of their income on the commodities  with the higher  price increases.  Engel's law
is quite important  in a setting like Java's, since food expenditures  average about 60 percent of total
household expenditures, and for  63.4 and 48.8 percent for the poorest and richest quintile,
respectively  (Annex Table 2).3°  Another observation is that, for all the three strategies, the pattern
of cost increases is U-shaped, lower for the middle quintiles than for the poorer and richer. The
higher increases for the poor appear to be related to two nonfood consumption  categories,  housing
and energy: both have high expenditure shares at lower income levels, and both have high cost-
increases  under all the three strategies.
Table  10: Pattern  of Cost  Increases  for Three  Control  Strategiese
Memorandum  Item:
Energy  Transport  Manufacturing  Average  expenditure
strategy  Strategy  abatement  Share (percent)
Food  0.13  0.15  0.30  57.1
Alcohol,  tobacco  0.33  0.34  1.03  5.7
Public  transport  1.05  8.52  0.74  2.2
Private  transport  3.51  9.52  2.37  1.6
Energy  6.00  4.35  2.16  7.9
Housing  3.30  1.37  3.36  7.7
Clothing  0.48  0.45  1.73  5.4
Services  0.48  0.74  0.52  6.0
Other  0.65  0.52  2.52  6.3
Total  Java consumption  basket  1.00  1.00  1.00  100.0
a. Scaled  to increase  costs  of the average  Java  consumption  basket  by I percent.
Engel's  law-that the share  of income  spent  on food  is declining  in income-is one of the few  stylized  facts
repeatedly  found  in studies  of household  expenditure  patterns.  Lluch  and  Powell  (1975)  in a study  of countries  at
different  income  levels,  find  that  expenditure  elasticities  for  food  with  respect  to income  tends  to fall  with  GNP  per
capita,  from  close  to one  to less  than  one  half.  Thus,  even  for such  a commodity  group,  incidence  will  depend  on
the  actual  income  level  and  its  distribution,  and  the  reliance  on an  estimated  demand  system  rather  than  budget  data
may  be fraught  with  difficulties.
24Table 11: Relative Cost Increases for Consumption Baskets, by Quintilea
Income groups (quintiles)
Poorer to richer
1. Quintile  2. Quintile  3. Quintile  4. Quintile  5. Quintile
Transportation  corntrols  0.86  0.80  0.83  0.95  1.32
Manufacturing  abatement  0.96  0.93  0.93  0.98  1.13
Energy  strategy  10.07  0.95  0.91  0.92  1.08
a. The reported  price  increase  is relative  to the price  increase  for  the average  consumption  basket.
Table 12 shows distributional  characteristics  for the control costs of the three simulated
strategies, including the estimated effects of intersectoral  transactions. The weighted incidence of
control costs is lower for the manufacturing control strategy than for the energy strategy, and
lowest for the transportation  strategy. Due to their nonmonotonous  incidence  patterns (Table 11), a
wider range of parameters  for inequality  aversion  was utilized to check for a possible re-ranking of
strategies.  However,  there is a consistent  repetition  of the result from consumption-based  strategies:
With  redistributive objectives, transportation strategies are  strengthened relative  to  energy
strategies, and a manufacturing strategy falls in between, as if  it were a blend of energy and
transport strategies.
Table 12: Distributional Characteristics  of Control Strategies including Productive Sectors
e=0.1  e=0.5  =I  =2
Transport  strategy  0.955  0.79  0.64  0.46
Manufacturing  control  strategy  0.962  0.82  0.69  0.52
Energy  strategy  0.964  0.83  0.71  0.56
In this case, the modeling of benefits cannot be performed, since the impacts in terms of
emission reductions  cannot be located (manufacturing  is spread out, and the input-output  table is
for Indonesia  as a whole). We may, however, utilize  a general  tendency observed from the analysis
of consumption-oriented  strategies:  The distributional  characteristics  of benefits do not differ much
by strategy (and never so much as to change  the balance  between strategies).  If we assume that the
benefit distribution for the three strategies is similar, redistributive objectives lead to a  more
controls  for the transportation  sector, less for the energy sector-with  the manufacturing  strategy  in
between.
An important general observation is that we can confirm the conjecture that costs for
strategies involving production activities would be  more  evenly  distributed-making  their
distributional  characteristics  more similar than for strategies which address specific consumption
activities.
254. Summary  and Conclusion
We develop an analytical framework  to analyze how distributional  considerations  would
modify the optimal provision of public goods. The framework weighs each household's net
benefits with the help of a welfare function,  allowing parametric  variation in the planner's aversion
to inequality (or, equivalently,  allowing variation in the cost at the margin of transferring income
between households). As a starting point for the analysis, we assumed various pollution control
strategies were exploited as they would be when costless transfer instruments are available, i.e.,
satisfying  the Samuelson  condition  for optimal  provision of public goods.
In tax analysis, a tool for income distribution analysis is a private good's distributional
characteristic. Our framework uses an analogous measure, the distributional characteristic for
public  goods,  and  shows  that  the  two  measures  are  adequate to  analyze  distributional
considerations in the provision of public goods. We also propose a functional form, which-in  a
maximally simple fashion-allows  for parametric variation in how the willingness-to-pay for
public goods depend  on the level of supply  and on household  income.
Assuming,  we believe  realistically,  that control  costs are distributed  by (something  like) the
polluter pays principle,  we first analyzed  the distribution  of control costs for strategies addressing
emissions generated  by household  consumption.  We found that a private transport  control strategy
distributes  control costs more progressively  among  households  than a public transport strategy,  and
both more progressively  than a strategy  addressing  household  energy  use.
For three  strategies addressing emissions from  productive sectors as  well, wealthier
households would face a  share of total control costs that is greater than their share of total
consumption  expenditure.  The reason is that poor household  allocate much of their budget to food,
and food is a commodity  group  which is relatively  "shielded" from pollution control costs. Also for
production-oriented strategies is  it the  case that  transport strategies are more progressively
distributed than energy strategies-with  a general manufacturing  pollution control strategy as an
intermediate  case between  the two.
We also examined the distribution  of benefits from air quality improvements,  determined
by the household's residential location (on which we have data) and by the income elasticity of
willingness-to-pay  for air quality improvements  (for which we rely on sensitivity analysis).  At an
income elasticity of one, households  experiencing  the same pollution reduction would value the
change in the same proportion  to their income, and total benefits are invariant  to redistribution  of
income. At lower elasticities,  a low-income  family would be willing to pay a greater share of its
income for a pollution  reduction  than would its wealthier  neighbors.
Under a unitary elasticity of willingness-to-pay  for air quality improvements,  inequality
aversion leads to less pollution control in general if a Java-wide program is evaluated. This is
because the program will include costs to households in rural areas who are poor and do not
experience any significant  air quality improvements.  In a Jakarta program, the balance between
strategies change-stricter  controls result for transport (and private transport in particular), while
less pollution control would result for energy use. Roughly summarized,  urban pollution control
programs will be strengthened  by inequality  aversion at income elasticities of willingness-to-pay
lower than one-and  reduced  at elasticities  greater  than one (in the latter  case, the net beneficiaries
26will  mostly  be  wealthy).  Strategies  targeting  luxury  goods  (transport)  and  necessities  (energy)
modifies the message somewhat, in an intuitive fashion.
The  finding  that  control  programs  with  wide  geographical  reach  are  unlikely  to  be
strengthened by inequality aversion is likely quite robust. It rests on the assumption that benefits of
air pollution  reductions are greater in areas with high levels of air pollution. For urban air pollution
control,  the  important  remaining  question  is how  the poor would value  air pollution  reductions,
relative  to  increased consumption  possibilities  for market  goods.  On the balance  between  urban
pollution  control strategies, we show that the benefit distribution does not vary much,  so that the
distributional  considerations  can be analyzed fairly well merely by comparing  Engel-functions  for
the  various  pollution  intensive  goods-assuming  that  their  price  increases  will  finance  the
respective strategies.
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30Annex Table 1: Expenditure  Shares, Transport and Energy
Private transport  Public transport  Electricity  Coal  Firewood  Kerosene  Gas
A.  Java
Quintile 1  0.002  0.012  0.007  0.0004  0.065  0.036  0.000
Quintile 2  0.004  0.013  0.009  0.0007  0.049  0.030  0.000
Quintile 3  0.007  0.017  0.012  0.0009  0.036  0.028  0.000
Quintile 4  0.015  0.025  0.016  0.0009  0.024  0.028  0.000
Quintile 5  0.043  0.038  0.022  0.0004  0.009  0.022  0.002
B.  Rest of Java
Quintile 1*  0.002  0.012  0.007  0.0003  0.065  0.036  0.000
Quintile 2  0.004  0.013  0.009  0.0007  0.050  0.030  0.000
Quintile 3  0.008  0.015  0.012  0.0009  0.037  0.028  0.000
Quintile 4  0.017  0.020  0.015  0.001  0.026  0.026  0.000
Quintile 5  0.048  0.026  0.018  0.0006  0.013  0.021  0.001
C.  Jakarta
Quintile 1*  0.00(  0.024  0.019  0.000  0.0000  0.106  0.000
Quintile 2  0.000  0.058  0.028  0.000  0.0000  0.050  0.000
Quintile 3  0.0003  0.068  0.025  0.0001  0.0002  0.046  0.0005
Quintile 4  0.003  0.076  0.025  0.0002  0.0001  0.043  0.0001
Quintile 5  0.031  0.062  0.031  0.000  0.0001  0.023  0.004
*  the partition is, for all three area definitions, in terms of Java quintiles.  The per  capita income ranges are as follows:
(rupiah/month)
Quintile 1  [9620  60153]  Mean: 43966
Quintile 2  [60163  84746]  72494
Quintile 3  [84752  1143951  98578
Quintile4  [114438  173507]  139313
Quintile 5  [173582  5436245]  323098
31Annex Table 2:  Expenditure Shares, A 9 Good System
Alcohol
and  Public  Private
Food  tobacco  transport  transport  Energy  Housing  Clothing  Services  Others
A.  Java
Quintile 1  .634  .056  .012  .002  .110  .078  .051  .032  .052
Quintile 2  .630  .059  .013  .004  .091  .069  .056  .042  .058
Quintile 3  .619  .062  .017  .007  .080  .068  .059  .050  .061
Quintile 4  .585  .064  .025  .015  .071  .076  .059  .060  .069
Quintile 5  .488  .055  .038  .043  .060  .110  .056  .103  .076
B.  Rest of Java
Quintile 1*  .634  .056  .012  .002  .109  .077  .051  .032  .052
Quintile 2  .630  .059  .013  .004  .091  .068  .056  .042  .058
Quintile 3  .621  .061  .015  .008  .080  .066  .059  .050  .061
Quintile 4  .593  .062  .020  .017  .070  .069  .060  .061  .072
Quintile 5  .518  .055  .026  .048  .057  .084  .057  .100  .088
C.  Jakarta
Quintile 1*  .430  .067  .024  .000  .125  .239  .047  .019  .050
Quintile 2  .536  .106  .058  .000  .090  .234  .038  .041  .050
Quintile 3  .490  .099  .068  .000  .083  .184  .048  .045  .038
Quintile 4  .470  .088  .076  .003  .079  .158  .048  .050  .041
Quintile 5  .422  .054  .062  .031  .065  .166  .052  .108  .052
*  The same definition as in Table I applies.
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